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EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. 
RIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS, 
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT, 
Defendants/Third-Party 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN 
DOE WILSON, individually and 
dba WILSON CALDER, 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
This case is one in which the trial court made numerous 
material errors requiring, at a minimum, significant corrections to 
the judgment, or more properly, a reversal with a remand for a new 
trial. The trial court used an improper measure of damages relying 
on a "loss of subsequent sale" rather than the proper "difference 
in fair market value before and after the negligent act," failed to 
follow the evidence on "loss of sale" theory, improperly awarded 
pre-judgment interest, improperly awarded numerous costs including 
1 
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Priority No. 15 
costs rejected in its own minute entry decision, improperly entered 
the Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law before the 
time for objections had run, and rejected without hearing all 
objections timely filed by Calder. Assuming Calder was negligent 
in signing the Certificate of Survey, the trial court's decision 
should be reversed on the numerous grounds set forth in Appellant's 
Brief. 
In many respects, this case is the Price-Orem Investment Co. 
v. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475 (Utah App. 1989) 
case revisited with the trial court ruling contrary to the 
precedent of this Court. These errors, which are analyzed in more 
detail in Appellant's Brief and below, revolve mainly around the 
two significant damage issues in this case, the improper measure of 
damages and pre-judgment interest. Calder submits that this Court 
follow its rulings in Price-Orem and reject the trial court's 
improper measure of damages and granting of pre-judgment interest. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CLAIM OF APPELLEES, BASED UPON A THEORY OF 
NEGLIGENCE, IS BARRED BY REASON OF THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS SINCE APPELLEES DISCOVERED, OR SHOULD HAVE 
DISCOVERED, THAT A PROBLEM IN THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THEIR RECEIPT OF DEEDS IN 1980. 
The claim against Calder is based in negligence. Under the 
prevailing statutes and case law, a action based in negligence must 
be brought within four (4) years of discovery or otherwise be 
2 
barred by the statute of limitations.1 The evidence clearly 
indicates the Appellees knew of the error in 1980, at the latest, 
thus actuating the statute of limitations. The trial court, 
however, errored in not ruling this action being time barred 
against Calder. 
Appellees argue, and Calder acknowledges, that the "discovery 
rule" is applicable in negligence cases such as this case. This 
proposition was set forth in the previous appeal from this same 
case when the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations would 
begin to run when the party "learns of or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have learned of the facts which give 
rise to the cause of action." Klinqer v. Kiqhtly, 791 P.2d 868 
(Utah 1990). 
Therefore, it is imperative to determine in this case when 
Appellees knew or should have known of the facts which give rise to 
the cause of action. However, the trial court made no ruling in 
its Minute Entry decision regarding when this occurred. The 
Findings of Fact are also silent on this issue. Calder requested 
a hearing to better understand the ruling of the court and clarify 
this issue, among others, but the trial court summarily denied the 
request for hearing. 
As such, and with no other basis to start from, an analysis of 
the facts must be taken in order to find the "rational" time at 
which the Appellees knew or should have known the facts necessary 
to bring this negligence action. This analysis will show that the 
1
 Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-12-25(2). 
3 
Appellees not only should have known, but in fact knew of the error 
in the legal description surrounding the subject property.2 
The facts in this case are described in more detail in 
Appellant's Brief, but a short summary is provided here. The 
Appellees first contact with a description of the subject property 
was through a plat map.3 The Appellees then purchased the lot 
through a Uniform Real Estate Contract in 1971 with a legal 
description using the metes and bounds method.4 After being 
contacted by the Strawberry River Estates, Inc. later in the same 
year regarding additional property, it was agreed that Strawberry 
River Estates would include the additional property with the 
original purchase of the Appellees.5 As such, a new Uniform Real 
Estate Contract using metes and bounds to describe the property was 
prepared in October of 1971, but was back dated to the original 
June 2, 1971, purchase date.6 
When the Appellees paid off the contract amount, they received 
a Warranty Deed for this property dated October 24, 1980.7 
However, it is undisputed that the legal metes and bounds 
description on the Warranty Deed differed from the description 
found in the Uniform Real Estate Contract used to purchase the 
2
 Kightly R. 413 - 414; 427 - 428. 
3
 Kightly R. 373, 420. Kreis R. 467, 471 - 472. 
4
 Ex. P-6. Kightly R. 406. Kreis R. 468 - 469. 
5
 Ex. P-4. Kightly R. 371 - 374. 
6
 Ex. P-6. Kightly R. 376 - 378. 
7
 Ex. P-8. 
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property.8 Mr. Kightly, one on the Appellees, testified that he 
reviewed the deed and noticed this discrepancy.9 He also testified 
that he received and reviewed two quitclaim deeds at about the same 
time and those legal descriptions were also inconsistent.10 Mr. 
Kightly testified that he knew there was a mistake, but "thought it 
might be just a typographical error."11 However, Mr. Kightly 
testified he did nothing to determine why the legal description had 
been changed.12 
This Court has stated that "mere ignorance of the existence of 
a cause of action does not prevent the running of the statue of 
limitations."13 In Sew v. Security Title Co. , 218 Adv. Rep. 34 
(Utah 1993), this Court stated that the discovery rule may be 
applied if there exists "exceptional or unique circumstances". 
This Court went on to state that there is a threshold requirement 
that the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff did not know and 
could not have known that a cause of action existed so as to file 
an action within the limitation period. See Warren v. Provo City 
Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992). 
8
 Compare Ex. P-6 and Ex. P-8. Kightly R. 412 - 413, 427 -
428. 
9
 R. 387; 412 - 413; 427. 
10
 Exs. D-l and D-2. R. 413 - 414; R 427. 
11
 R. 414. 
12
 R. 413 - 414; 427 - 428. 
13
 Sew v. Security Title Co., 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah 
1993), citing Mvers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). 
5 
In the case at hand, the trial court made no finding of the 
existence of such "exceptional or unique circumstances." Likewise, 
the trial court did not find that the Appellees met the threshold 
requirement as set forth in Sew.14 In fact, as demonstrated 
above, the evidence is to the contrary. Appellees have not 
disputed, but have in fact confirmed that there was an error in the 
legal description and the Appellees failed to investigate the 
errors. 
The uncontroverted evidence shows that the facts were 
available and easily ascertainable in 1980 and the Appellees knew 
of the errors when they received the warranty and two quitclaim 
deeds with differing legal descriptions from the purchase 
contract.15 The Appellees also testified that they did nothing to 
investigate why there was an error.16 The evidence clearly 
supports a finding that the four year limitation period began to 
run, at the latest in 1980. 
By not investigating, the Appellees allowed 14 years to pass 
before bringing this action. There is no question that not only 
have memories faded, but John Stafford, the survey party chief and 
the principal party involved with the survey certificate, passed 
away and was therefore unavailable to testify.17 It is clear that 
14
 Sew, 218 U.A.R. at 36. 
15
 Compare Ex. P-6, P-8, D-l, and D-2. 
16
 Kightly R. 413 - 414; 427 - 428. 
17
 The trial court also refused to admit the survey diary of 
Mr. Stafford which was made contemporaneously with the disputed 
events. See Point III relating to the admissibility of the survey 
6 
the passage of time has prejudiced Calder in his defense of this 
case due to the fact that memories have faded, responsible parties 
have disappeared, and key witnesses have passed away. 
Therefore, as of 1980, Appellees knew of the error, but did 
nothing to investigate. The four year statute of limitations began 
to run from this time. See Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 
1990). Appellees did not bring this action until 1986 - more than 
four years later. The trial court, in the face of Appellees' own 
testimony, errored by not dismissing this action against Calder as 
being time barred. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT USED AN IMPROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN 
CALCULATING THE AMOUNT TO AWARD TO APPELLEES. 
Under the theory of negligence, there must be a logical causal 
connection between the negligent act of the defendant and the 
damages claimed by the plaintiff. That is, there must be found to 
be some proximate cause. In the case at hand, there is no such 
causal connection between the negligence, if any, of Calder and the 
damages claimed by Appellees. Further, the measure of damages used 
by the trial court was inappropriate. 
a) Calder did not participate in the preparation of 
the documents used to transfer title to the 
Appellees. 
Appellees acknowledge that Calder did not participate in the 
preparation of the documents used to transfer title to the 
diary as a business record pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence 
803(6). 
7 
Appellees. Appellees argue that this fact is irrelevant because 
the damages awarded Appellees in this suit "were not for the 
original property loss."18 However, assuming Calder was negligent, 
this would have been the proper measure of damages. 
Further, Appellees admit that had they known of the error, 
"they would not have been likely to enter into a sale of land which 
they did not own."19 Appellees claim damages against Calder 
damages for the "loss of the benefit of the bargain" for a sale of 
property, the most valuable of which Appellees never owned. Calder 
had no control or involvement in what property Appellees did or did 
not receive. 
The contract which was prepared and created ownership 
interests was done ten months before Calder's alleged negligent 
act.20 Calder had no part in the legal transfer of the 
property.21 Therefore, Calder?s negligence in signing the 
certificate, if any, in no way altered what property the Appellees 
had already received from the Strawberry River Estates. 
b) Appellees did not use the legal description 
contained in the survey certificate in their 
attempted transfer of the property to the Klingers. 
Appellees do not dispute the fact that legal description 
contained in the survey certificate was not used in the documents 
18
 Appellees Brief, pg. 16. 
19
 Appellees Brief, pg. 17. 
20
 Ex. P-l; Kightly R. 407. 
21
 Calder R. 487, 503. Ostler R. 536 - 537, 540. 
8 
when attempting to transfer title to the property. Appellees 
rather focus on other benefits which one may gain from having a 
survey performed. While there may be other benefits from having 
the map, the fact remains that Appellees did not use or rely upon 
the legal description contained in the survey certificate. 
Appellees concede they never owned part of the property which 
they attempted to convey and that they did not use the legal 
description contained in Calder's certificate. Instead, Appellees 
used the description contained in their warranty deed received in 
1980 from Security Title.22 There was no reliance on the accuracy 
of the certificate, only reliance on the accuracy of the warranty 
deed. 
The trial court erroneously found that Calder, by signing a 
certificate containing the legal description contained in 
Appellees' purchase contract, was liable for Appellees' loss of the 
benefit of the subsequent sale where the Appellees used a different 
legal description. Therefore, no causal connection existed. The 
negligence, if any, on the part of Calder was superseded and cut 
off by the negligence of the party who prepared the warranty deed 
containing a different legal description, the same legal 
description which ultimately used to transfer the property to the 
Klingers. 
Compare P-6, P-7, and P-8. Rightly R. 390. 
9 
c) The damages claimed by Appellees against Calder 
were not the appropriate measure of damages. 
In awarding damages in this tort action, it was improper for 
the trial court to use the amount of a lost sale which took place 
more than ten years after the alleged tort and injury. 
This Court held in Price-Orem, another negligent surveying 
case very similar to this case, that: 
the measure of damages for permanent injury to real 
property is the difference between the market value of 
the property immediately before and immediately after the 
injury,23 (emphasis added) 
This Court went on to state that: 
[b]ecause liability attached at the time of the loss [the 
appraisal made near that time] is more relevant to the 
actual loss incurred under this measure of damages than 
the subsequent historical data, (Id.) (See also Ault v. 
Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Utah App. 1987). 
The Appellees purchased the property in 1971 for $5,500.24 
The negligent act, if any, by Calder occurred in 1972. Therefore, 
the damages would be the difference in value of the property right 
before the act and the value of the property right after the 
negligent act in 1972. 
The trial court, however, inappropriately considered the value 
of the land which significantly increased to approximately $32,000 
in 1983 due to oil crises.25 This subsequent historical data is 
not the appropriate basis to measure damages. Appellees did not 
23
 Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown, and Gunnel, 
Inc., 784 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989). 
24
 Ex. P-6. 
25
 Rightly R. 401 - 402. Wilkerson R. 436. 
10 
present any evidence at trial as to property value in 1972, the 
time the tort and injury occurred. 
By its award of damages, the trial court has inappropriately 
allowed the Appellees to recoup from Calder the profit they would 
have received in a sale of the property more than 10 years after 
the tort, and property which the Appellees never owned. This 
ruling is contrary to applicable case law and must be reversed. 
d) The trial courtf s finding of damages is not 
supported by the evidence. 
Even though the measure of damages awarded by the trial court 
was improper as discussed immediately above, the trial court 
compounded its error by using figures that do not reflect the 
evidence presented. Even though this point is now moot, a brief 
recount will be provided. 
In Appellees1 Brief, the Appellee cites to the record 
concerning the testimony regarding the value of the property. In 
referring to the testimony cited, the only valuations given are 
from the testimony of the Appellees' expert witness. He testified 
that the Appellees had received an offer to purchase the land for 
$10,000, but the Appellees, contrary to Appellees' expert's advice, 
turned the offer down.26 When asked what the present value of the 
property was, Appellees' expert testified that it was worth $8,000, 
not $6,000 as stated on Ex. P-9.27 This exhibit was also only 
26
 R. 445, 450. 
27
 R. 448. 
11 
admitted for only illustrative purposes. In closing arguments, 
Appellees1 counsel in recounting the evidence presented that the 
present value of the property was $8,000.28 
Appellees contend that because there is conflicting testimony 
about the present value of the property being either $10,000 or 
$8,000, it is nevertheless reasonable for the trial court to have 
concluded that the present value of the property was $6,000. Such 
is not the case. There is no rational basis whatsoever to support 
the accounting as set forth in Exhibit P-9. The trial court had no 
legal or factual basis to rule according and such a finding is 
contradictory to the evidence presented at trial. Appellees 
received an offer for $10,000. This appears to be the most 
conclusive evidence of present market value. This measure of 
damages is not only inapplicable to this case, but the trial 
court's award of damages does not properly reflect the evidence 
presented. 
e) Conclusion 
Accordingly, there is no logical causal connection between the 
damages claimed by Appellees and any negligence on the part of 
Calder. Appellees were not damaged by Calder?s negligence in 
signing the plat certificate. The Appellees were damaged, if at 
all, due to the negligence of the person who prepared the documents 
which contained a legal description different than what the 
Appellees intended and believed they were purchasing. Furthermore, 
even if Calder were liable, the evidence presented does not support 
28
 Closing Arg. pg. 10. 
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the amount of damages awarded to Appellees. The trial court 
clearly applied an incorrect measure of damages when it improperly 
adopted the "loss of subsequent sale" analysis rather than the 
appropriate measure being the difference in the fair market value 
before and after the negligent act of Calder. As such, this award 
must be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE THE 
BUSINESS DIARY KEPT BY JOHN STAFFORD, THE CHIEF OF THE 
SURVEY PARTY, WHO HAD DIED BEFORE TRIAL. 
The survey diary of John Stafford was offered as evidence at 
trial as a business record. Calder in its initial brief set forth 
the standard for determining when a record should be admitted into 
evidence under the business record exception to the hearsay rule. 
Appellees appear to concede that the requirements were met and the 
diary was admissible. Appellees, however, now contend that the 
diary could have been deemed inadmissable as being irrelevant.29 
Such a contention is not supported by the record and the 
circumstances surrounding the diary. 
This diary, which was recorded contemporaneously as the 
disputed events occurred, would have been evidence to contradict 
testimony of Appellees including the fact that Stafford was in fact 
hired, not by the Appellees, but by Strawberry River Estates to 
perform the survey work. The diary would have contradicted the 
testimony of Appellees that Stafford was requested to survey lots 
29
 Appellees Brief, pg. 23. 
13 
30 and 31 and not the metes and bounds description from the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. The diary also clarifies the fact that 
Calder did not have an office in Duchesne as asserted by the 
Appellees. 
This evidence is relevant not only as to the credibility of 
the witnesses, but to clarify who hired whom to do what, when the 
survey was performed, the location of the survey, etc. This 
evidence would clearly refute Finding of Fact No. 8 and casts great 
doubt on Finding of Fact Nos. 9 and 16.30 This evidence is 
extremely relevant to the overall understanding of this case and 
the relationship between the parties. Furthermore, there was no 
objection or ruling as to the relevance of the diary, only that the 
diary was hearsay and did not meet the requirements for the 
business rule exception.31 
The trial court's ruling to deny the admittance of this diary 
should be overturned where the court has abused its discretion. 
State ex rel. Marquez, 560 P.2d 342 (Utah 1977). The proper 
foundation for the admission of the diary was laid as provided by 
Rule 803(6). See also, Hansen v. Heath, 211 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 
(Utah 1993). 
The trial court incorrectly ruled that this diary was 
inadmissible as being hearsay when it should have admitted the 
diary into evidence under the business record exception to the 
hearsay rule. Furthermore, the diary is clearly relevant to the 
30
 See Finding of Facts. 
31
 Court R. 508 - 511, 532 - 533. 
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action. As such, in this case, the trial court clearly abused its 
discretion. As set forth above and in Appellant's Brief, an 
adequate foundation was laid as required by Rule 803(6) and the 
trial courtf s refusal to admit the diary into evidence was clearly 
erroneous. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST 
The trial court's awarding of pre-judgment interest to the 
Appellees is clearly erroneous and contrary to case law. The 
Appellees contend that Calder's reliance on Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. 
Rollins, Brown, & Gunnel1, 784 P.2d 475 (Utah App. 1989), a ruling 
from this Court, is misplaced. Appellees argue that Price-Orem is 
a breach of contract action with the awarding of "liquidated 
damages" and not a tort action as is the case at hand. This 
assertion is completely contrary to the facts and holding of that 
case. 
In Price-Orem, this Court determined that the prevailing party 
was not entitled to prejudgment interest. Price-Orem was an action 
for negligent surveying, not breach of contract as asserted by 
Appellees. There is also no mention of liquidated damages. That 
case is not distinguishable as Appellees contend, but is very much 
on point and controlling precedent. 
In Price-Orem, the plaintiff sought, as in the case at hand, 
damages against the surveyor for loss of value to the property due 
15 
to the negligent survey. This Court cited precedent law from the 
Utah Supreme Court and stated in part: 
[W]here damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated 
with mathematical accuracy . . . the amount of damage 
must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact 
at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is 
not allowed, (emphasis added) (citing Biork v. April 
Indus. Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977)). 
This Court further stated that the damages must be ascertained "in 
accordance with fixed rules of evidence . . . rather than be guided 
by their best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed . . ." 
(Price-Orem citing Fell v. Union Pac. Rv. Co., 88 P. 1003, 1007 
(Utah 1907)). 
In analyzing the facts of that case and the method used in 
determining the damages, this Court found that when the trial court 
uses "fair market values" of real property to ascertain damages, 
the damages "cannot be determined with mathematical precision, and 
may be inherently uncertain ..." This Court went on to indicate 
that even though there is a sufficient basis to uphold the award of 
damages when the damages are not determinable with mathematical 
precision, "it is far too uncertain to support a prejudgment 
interest award." Price-Orem at 482-83. 
The trial court in this case determined that Calder was 
negligent in his signing of the survey certificate.32 The court 
found no breach of contract. The trial court awarded Appellees the 
"Loss on Sale" and calculated the damages by taking the sales 
Minute Entry R. 291. Conclusions of Law R. 302. 
16 
price, less present value of the property.3 The trial court's 
use of the present market value is, at best, an estimation. This 
method of damage calculation is inherently uncertain and without 
mathematical precision. As pre-judgment interest was found to be 
improper in Price-Orem. it is likewise improper in this case and 
must be reversed. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ASSESSED COSTS IN THIS CASE 
INCLUDING THE FILING FEES OF THE PRIOR APPEAL, THE 
WITNESS FEES IN THE FIRST TRIAL IN WHICH CALDER WAS NOT 
A PARTY, THE WITNESS FEES FOR EXPERTS OF APPELLEE, THE 
TRANSCRIPT OF THE FIRST TRIAL, PRINTING COSTS OF THE 
BRIEFS IN THE FIRST APPEAL, PHOTOCOPIES, ETC. 
While, as both parties have pointed out, the trial court does 
have some discretion in awarding costs in an action, there are 
clear parameters within which the trial court must remain. In the 
case at hand, however, the trial court clearly abused its 
discretion in its awarding of costs. 
As set forth at length in Appellant's Brief, there are 
parameters which are provided to the courts when it comes to 
awarding costs. Appellees in their brief object to Calder's demand 
for a "full accounting for every penny awarded." Calder requested, 
but was not afforded by the trial court, the opportunity to object 
and gain an understanding of the costs which Appellees were 
claiming in their Memorandum of Costs. This alone is grounds for 
remanding this issue to the trial court for further determination. 
Minute Entry R. 291. Ex. P-9. 
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However, many of the costs on their face are inappropriate, 
contrary to law, and/or completely contrary to the Minute Entry 
ruling of the trial court. 
Calder has described in great detail the errors and abuse of 
discretion which was committed by the trial court in the awarding 
of costs as they relate to witness, clerk, constable, and reporter 
fees along with the "miscellaneous costs" claimed by the Appellees. 
Furthermore, Appellees have not disputed any of the assertions set 
forth in Appellant's Brief. 
Although a trail court may have discretion in regard to the 
allowance of certain costs, in this case, the trial court clearly 
abused its discretion by awarding costs contrary to its own Minute 
Entry ruling, contrary to law, and costs from other actions.34 As 
such, the award of these costs must be reversed, or at a minimum, 
remanded to the trial court for further determination as to the 
appropriateness of the costs. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED CALDERfS OBJECTIONS TO 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, DOING SO 
WITHOUT EVEN A HEARING ON THE OBJECTIONS, PARTICULARLY 
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT HAD ISSUED ONLY A VERY BRIEF 
CONCLUSORY MINUTE ENTRY, WITHOUT ANY FINDINGS OF FACT, ON 
ITS DECISION OF THE CASE. 
Appellees in their brief do not dispute any of the facts set 
forth in Appellant's Brief. They only contend that such a hearing 
is discretionary on the part of the trial court judge. However, as 
R. 291. 
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was set forth in Appellant's Brief, the facts in this case are a 
clear example of a trial court's abuse of discretion. 
The trial court issued a brief minute order regarding its 
ruling in the case.35 However, the proposed Finding of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law which were prepared by the Appellees did not 
conform to the memorandum decision and also contradicted evidence 
presented at trial. These proposed Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law were then adopted by the trial court without 
modification.36 
The trial court, at the same time, signed the Judgment 
prepared by Appellees, including prejudgment interest.37 The trial 
court signed these documents even before the time had expired for 
Calder to object or comment on the proposed findings. 
Nevertheless, Calder timely filed his responses to these 
documents specifically objecting to certain findings, included 
costs and prejudgment interest.38 Calder also requested a hearing 
for argument as to the Findings of Fact, Judgment and Memorandum of 
Costs.39 Appellees did not contest Calder's objections to the cost 
or the judgment in their reply.40 
R. 291. 
R. 296 - 303. 
R. 304 - 306. 
R. 307 - 310. 
R. 311 - 312. 
R. 313 - 318. 
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Despite Appellees apparent acceptance of certain objections by 
Calder, the trial court issued a minute entry order summarily 
denying Calderfs request for a hearing, concluding that the 
findings and judgment reflect the courts decision.41 This action 
by the trial court was a clear abuse of discretion and contrary to 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and the 
relevant case law as set forth in Appellant's Brief. Calderfs 
request for hearing should have been granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellees claim against Calder for negligence is governed by 
the applicable four-year statute of limitations and the "discovery 
rule". Appellees knew that a problem existed in 1980 when they 
received deeds transferring title, but did nothing to investigate. 
The trial court errored in not finding that the action was time 
barred in the face of this undisputed evidence. This ruling should 
be reversed, and the action against Calder be dismissed. 
Further, assuming Calder was negligent, there remains the fact 
that there is no proper or logical causal connection between any 
negligence of Calder and the damages claimed by Appellees. 
Furthermore, the evidence does not support the amount of damages 
awarded. Damages were awarded based on a "loss of sale" measure 
rather than the appropriate measure of damages comparing the fair 
market value both immediately before and immediately after the 
41
 R. 319. 
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injury. As such, if damages are awarded, they must, at a minimum, 
be reduced to reflect the proper measure of damages. 
The trial court improperly excluded from evidence the business 
diary kept by John Stafford, one of the surveyors, who had died in 
Alaska a few months before trial. The diary meets the requirements 
as set forth in the Rules of Evidence as a business record. The 
diary is relevant in this case in that it provides evidence which 
irrefutably contradicts specific Findings of Facts, clarifies the 
relationship of the parties, and sheds light as to the credibility 
of witnesses. This Court must remand this case to trial with the 
direction to admit this diary into evidence. 
The trial court also improperly awarded pre-judgment interest 
in this case. Price-Orem provides controlling law that pre-
judgment interest can only be awarded when the damages can be 
calculated with mathematical certainty. The award in this case 
against Calder was based in negligence, and calculated using 
estimated property market value. Such an analysis is not 
sufficiently certain to justify pre-judgment interest. As such, 
this Court must reverse the trial courts awarding of pre-judgment 
interest. 
The trial court improperly assessed costs in this case. The 
trial court erroneously awarded costs contrary to its own Minute 
Entry decision, contrary to law, and costs from other actions. 
This Court must reverse the trial court's awarding of costs, or at 
a minimum, remand for further determination. 
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The trial court improperly denied Calder's objections to the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court did so 
without even granting a hearing on the objections. The action must 
be remanded for hearing on Calder's objections. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this // day of February, 1994. 
WALSTAD fit BABCOCK 
By: VJU^^ITMlQfl 
Robert F/ Babcock 
Brian J. Babcock 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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